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Fusion Reactor Safety 
  Terminology (reliability , safety,  security, ……..) 
  Risk analyses (FTA-FaultTree Analysis, FMEA-Failure Mode Effect Analysis) 
  Nuclear safety analysis (objectives, operationalisation, MLD- Master Logic Diagram, demonstration)  
  Dose concept  (ALARA-Principle) 
  Fusion Safety Concept   (comparison with NPP- where are we today?) 
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Terminology-Reliability  
reliability = probability that  system meets the required specified function 
within a certain time interval and  
under normal operation conditions  
 
 
 
 
Measures of reliability technology  
elimination of errors /failures/ malfunctions 
early detection 
initiation of countermeasures (messaging, design measures: redundancy, diversity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof of realibility   
reliability calculation (result: e.g. guarantee time) 
 reliability = part of the quality assurance  
robust design + 
operational 
monitoring 
 
regular  
inspection 
intervals 
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Terminology-Reliability  
Reliability analysis 
Goals:  
prognosis of expected reliability (hazard) 
detection and elimination of vulnerabilities  
conduction of  comparative studies 
Options :  
quantitative: calculation of reliability, failure rate analysis, probabilistic  reliability prediction  
(Markov or Boole model, lifetime distributions, Fault tree analysis-FTA) 
qualitative:  systematic investigation of fault effects and failures, failure modes analysis (ABC 
analysis, check lists, failure mode  effects  analysis-FMEA, Fault tree analysis-FTA) 
Types of reliability analysis 
inductive : forward tracking of events leading leading to accidents –FMEA 
deductive: backward derivation of possible failures, leading to accidents – FTA 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
qualitative, inductive reliability analysis 
detection of error sources in order to avoid or reduce consequences  
error prevention (preventive measure)  
identify the vulnerabilities to revise this then constructively 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
qualitative or quantitative, deductive reliability Analysis 
representation of  top event (risk) in relation to the causes leading to this top event  
identify causes that lead alone or in combination with other causes to an error 
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Terminology-Reliability  
Types of reliability analysis 
inductive : forward tracking of events leading leading to accidents –FMEA 
deductive: backward derivation of possible failures, leading to accidents – FTA 
 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
qualitative, inductive reliability analysis 
detection of error sources in order to avoid or reduce consequences  
error prevention (preventive measure)  
identify the vulnerabilities to revise this then constructively 
 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
qualitative or quantitative, deductive reliability Analysis 
representation of a top event (system failure, risk) in relation to the causes that 
lead to this top event  
identify causes that lead alone or in combination with other causes to an error 
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Terminology - safety  
safety      = system state, from which within given limits and for a  
                    prescribed time interval no danger emanates.  
 safety     = absence of danger (system does not pose danger to outside) 
safe state= state in which despite failure(s) (by operator, malfunctions,… 
                     no danger emanates 
 
Examples:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
thermal plant: 
exceeding max. 
pressure 
loop systems:  
unintended 
leakage 
driving car:  
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Terminology - safety  
Safety measures  
actions directed against dangerous effects of errors and failures  
prevention of danger in case of error/failure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rationale for safety measures   approval by a safety authority  
detection method         safety case  
 
 
 
control of reaction 
  stop media service 
 relief valve 
 
 
 
 
design measures 
 intrumentation 
personnel protection 
 
material choices 
(code&standards) 
 
 
 fabrication quality 
 
 
  operat. monitoring 
personnel equipment 
(protective clothing) 
 
 
 
driving cars are  
intrinsically unsafe !!! 
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Terminology-  plant safety  
NOTE (difficult in many languages)  
 
SAFETY     = prevention of hazards originating from the plan itself 
 
SECURITY=  prevention of human or environmental threads on the  
                      system leading to states, in which system can get dangerous.  
 
Most known to you in terms of security:                       
 
 
 
 
 
For nuclear systems:  
Protection against external hazards (terrorist attack, flooding, earth quake, …..) 
 Design measures according to (nat. and/or internat.) prescriptions 
SYSTEM (PLANT) SAFETY= SAFETY + SECURITY  
 
 
 
video 
survaillance airport 
security 
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Terminology – how to correlate safety and risk ? 
What is the difference ?   risk – danger – safety  
limiting risk (LR) acceptable risk (<LR) inacceptable risk (>LR) 
safe dangerous 
basic risk  
(no measures) 
minimum required   
risk reduction 
residual risk  
actual 
risk reduction 
 high risk low risk 
not 
biking at 
all 
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Terminology – safety analysis 
safety analysis = requirement for operational (nuclear) license 
Safety Assessment 
consecutive process  
description of the plant 
system 
(incl. all subcomponents) 
description of environment 
and impacts  
hazards  analysis 
identification of hazards 
risk  analysis 
impact assessment of  
hazards (consequences) 
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Terminology-  phrases around 
What means ?   
availability = time fraction of system usability  
                     (probability of a repairable system to be  
                      functional at a given point in time)  
reliability   = safety + availability + robustness  
                     (system property allowing to trust in the provided  
                     functionality) 
 availability  reliability 
 
Other often used words: 
hazard = physical situation with potential for human injury,  
                damage to property, damage to the environment or  
          any combination.  ability to create harm. 
risk      = likelihood of undesirable events (hazards) to occur  
          within specified time and/or specified circumstances 
               (system property allowing to trust in provided functionality) 
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What to do ?     quantification of risk by numbers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Objective 
 identify hazards 
 analyze and evaluate the risk associated with each hazard 
 elaborate appropriate measures/means/methods to eliminate or reduce 
hazards 
 if you can not eliminate or reduce hazards, identify appropriate ways to 
eliminate or reduce the risks associated 
 holds for any engineering system (from mobile reactor)  
Introduction- Risk analyses 
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Risk analyses- Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Context 
FTA =deductive method. It establishes a graphical relation between a top event 
(system failure, threat, ...) and causes leading to this top event. 
starting from the undesired top event, the possible causes are searched.  
causes can occur alone or in combination with other causes, leading to a defined error 
Aims  
realistic modeling of the system on component basis in order to analyze 
failure mode and failure causes  
establishiment of functional relations of failures  
description of impact of failures on the system  
Use of FTA  
preventive quality assurance  
system analysis  
troubleshooting for newly emerging errors 
FTA –structure 
Graphical representation across several system levels, which are connected via 
logical connections  
 
system 
failure 
failure of  
sub-system 
component 
failure 
cause of damage 
plant shut-down loss-of flow accident pump blocked 
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Risk analyses- Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Qualitative FTA -execution 
Sequence 
 
 
 
 
identification of all failures, critical events and event combinations 
creation of objective assessment criteria 
documentation   
 
 system analysis  
determination of required system functions and their allocation to individual elements 
identification of relationships between system functions (cooperation of elements to attain 
required function, response to environmental impact, system response to internal failures 
of elements, system response to external failures linked to the system)  
 definition of adverse events and failure criteria 
Define preventive and corrective measures 
Prevention: definition of adverse events by noncompliance with functions/requirements 
Corrective measures: definition of an occurred failure/malfunction as adverse event 
 in view of damage severity (radiological impact) 
 
system 
analysis 
1 
postulation of 
events of 
failure criteria 
2 
evaluation of 
component 
failure mode 
3 
elaboration 
of fault tree 
4 
qualitative 
assessment  
(consequences) 
5 
1 
2 
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Risk analyses- Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Determination of component/system failure modes 
Primary failure: component failure due to weakness or errors a priory present in the system –
failure in permissable operating conditions 
Secondary failure: component failure caused by environmental or operational conditions –  
loss in design extension conditions  
Forced failure: component failure of functioning system by incorrect operation or false/invalid 
signals/links – operational of maintenance error but also deliberate mistakes  
Creation of fault tree  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 often quite complex, good 
preparation mandatory,  
adequate splittings sensible 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
4 
identification of top 
event 
can event causing  
failure reduced to 
one component ? 
consideration of all 
individual failures of 
the component 
determine causes entry of component 
failure in fault tree 
yes 
all faults identified ? 
no 
no 
yes 
complete fault tree 
system 
analysis 
postulation of 
events of failure 
criteria 
evaluation of 
component failure 
mode 
elaboration of 
fault tree 
qualitative 
assessment  
(consequences) 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Risk analyses- Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Qualitative assessment 
Reliability assessed qualitative via graphical structure, assessment of  system weakness  
Critical path: fault tree branches, in which component failures are not protected by system 
inherent prevention /check mechanisms  
Critical quantity: subtree of the fault tree, which contains the minimum combination of 
individual elements whose failure leads to the adverse event.  
 Critical path/quantity allows statement on strongest/weakest branch of fault tree  
 
 
 
How good is a FTA ? 
Benefits 
precise adjustment to the object of investigation possible 
deeper system content information by evaluation of the fault tree 
allows identification of (still) unknown causes of failure 
Disadvantages  
Precise adjustment to the object of investigation possible 
intensive time/money consuming analysis  
expert know-how indispensable  
5 
system 
analysis 
postulation of 
events of failure 
criteria 
evaluation of 
component failure 
mode 
elaboration of 
fault tree 
qualitative 
assessment  
(consequences) 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Risk analyses-Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
FMEA- what is it about ? 
FMEA=qualitative method of reliability 
inductive procedure to identify all system failure modes 
depiction of all possible causes and effects of faults  
Determination of consequences for the system 
FMEA = preventive measure to 
prevent errors/failures  
to detect errors  
FEMA Sequence  
 
 
 
 
 
FEMA tools  
Fishbone – cause –effect diagram 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Event Tree Analysis 
Matrix Diagrams (product management, economics) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
evaluation of a 
causes leading 
to a 
malfunction 
creation of structure 
of functions/mal-
functions of all 
system components 
execution of 
risk analysis 
of 
malfunctions 
risk 
assessment 
in FMEA 
sheet 
system  
measures to 
avoid or detect 
potential errors 
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Risk analyses-Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
                                nuclear engineering 
FMEA sheet components – example 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 RESULT: (hopefully) full list of elementary failures  
com-
ponent 
 
operati
onal 
state 
failure 
mode 
freq.-
cat. 
causes preventive 
action 
conse-
quence 
preven. 
action on 
conseq. 
postulated 
initiating 
event  
(PIE) 
comment /specific 
occurence 
frequency/codes and 
standards used 
piping  no ext. 
leak 
III weld 
fault, 
pipe 
wall 
flaw, 
constr. 
fault 
des. materials 
selection , 
pre-service 
inspect., low 
flow-induc. 
vibration in  
design, NDT 
leaks 
small to 
moderate 
amount of 
coolant to  
equatorial 
port 
small loss 
of coolant 
accident. 
shut down 
by the end 
of  seq., 
drain to 
drain tank 
to limit 
radiologic 
release, 
increase 
cooling of 
neighboring 
system to 
limit 
superheat 
of other 
systems 
small 
LOCA 
xy m piping length 
oper. 3360h/y ;liquid 
nonreactive in air 
/H2O, should not pose 
chemical reactivity 
concern. spill must be 
kept from bellows 
seal.  
 
9. 10-9 /h/m 
 
 
 
 
e.g.  
 
EGG-SSRE- 
8875 
ext. 
rupture 
III 
 
…. 
plugging III …… 
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Risk analyses-Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
FEMA – system analysis- provides individual results  for 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety                          Robustness    Availability  
 Reliability  
 
FEMA – system safety analysis 
Classifaction in event classes 
Event category I II III IV 
category description operational events/ 
plant conds. 
planned/required 
for normal 
operation 
likely event sequences 
not planned but likely to 
occur once or more  
during the life time but not 
included in category I.  
unlikely sequences 
that are postulated 
but not likely to 
occur during  
lifetime  
extremely unlikely event  
sequences that are 
postulated but are not likely  
to occur during lifetime with 
a very large margin.  
frequency range f <10-2 10-2<f <10-4 10-4<f <10-6 
system condition normal incident accident accident 
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Risk analyses-Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
What FMEA results mean in terms of SAFETY? 
 
 
 
 
CLASS 1: Normal operation 
No failure of the nuclear first barrier (walls) 
Performance of the purification system consistent with a few 
leaking rods 
CLASS 2: Low frequencies events 
  No failure of the first barrier 
  CLASS 3: Low probabilities accidents 
 Nuclear materials barriers might be damaged 
 Bring back the reactor to a safe state (use of 
diverse/redundant systems) 
   CLASS 4 : Hypothetical accidents 
 Termination of nuclear reaction,   
 Reactor geometry remains coolable 
 Geometry of reactor remains intact 
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Beyond design basis accidents 
> CLASS 4  accidental conditions  
Objective to preserve plant withdrawn  
Preservation of ability to ensure 
coolability and  
confinement of radioactive products 
Causes: Multiples Accidents 
Steam Pipe Break (LOCA, LOFA)  + Steam 
Generator Tube Failure  
First wall leak + explosion + failure of fusion 
power system shut down system 
Risk analyses-Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
CLASS 5 
Design mitigating radiological consequences 
outside plant (off-site emergency responses)  
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Nuclear safety analyses- Objectives & Operationalization 
Nuclear safety objectives  
Protection of public and environment against radiological hazards  
Protection of site workers against radiation exposure according to ALARA-principle  
(As Low As Reasonably Achievable)  
Employment of measures to prevent accidents and mitigate their consequences 
Elimination of need for public evacuation in any accident  
Minimization of activated waste 
 Assignment of  safety functions  
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Nuclear safety analyses- Objectives & Operationalization 
Safety functions of a  nuclear  power plant (FPP) 
 Primary safety functions 
 Confinement of radioactive materials 
 Control of operational releases  
 Limitation of accidental releases  
 No control of reactivity control in FUSION required  
( absence of nuclear chain reactions like in NPP !!!) 
 
 Secondary safety functions 
 Ensure emergency power shutdown 
 Provisions for decay heat removal (potentially passive) 
 Control of thermal energy (coolant(-s) enthalpy) 
 Control chemical energies  
 Control of other potentially likely energy discharges or interactions 
 Limitation of airborne & liquid operating releases to environment 
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Nuclear safety analyses- Objectives & Operationalization 
From where does the radio-nuclides arise?  
 
14MeV neutrons from D-T reaction 
 
 
 
Neutron interaction with matter  excited material states, radiation (a,b,g) 
             material transmutation (new nuclides) 
 
 
Deuteron 
Helium -3.6MeV 
Intermediate 
core 
High energy 
neutron-14.1MeV 
Tritium 
elastic scattering inelastic  
scattering 
particle emission:  
(n,2n), (n,a), etc absorbtion 
Crucial parameter:  
 nuclear cross-section s    
(measured in barn=10-24cm2) 
 s dependent on incident neutron 
energy (E) and angle (j)  
 Computation by MCNP  
(Monte Carlo Neutron Particle Transport) 
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© N. Waeckel, EDF 
Where to start for the safety analyses ?   
built a generic fusion reactor  
 
Ingredients 
all components necessary to  
operate fusion plant. 
 provision of a top down  
view of the nuclear plant  
structure (interlinks of  
major components)  
  
 
Nuclear safety analyses- Objectives & Operationalization 
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Nuclear safety analyses- Objectives & Operationalization 
How does the FPP look like?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 housing of components by buildings (static barriers) 
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Nuclear safety analyses- Objectives & Operationalization 
How does the FPP look like?   
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What to do next ? 
Identify all sources of energy and plant internal radiological potential 
 
What does this scope ? 
coolant (stored enthalpy) 
radionuclide inventory (tritium, volatile fission products, activated corrosion 
product(-s))  
chemical reaction(-s) 
nuclear decay heat (operation time, materials used) 
 as for nuclear power plants (NPP) 
fusion plasma (stored energy) 
magnetic energy (coils) 
cryo-inventory  
heating systems 
 specific fusion power plant (FPP) 
 
Sufficient ?   NO !!! 
release time, fractions,  
detection time, capability 
DONE  ?        NO !!! 
 
Nuclear safety analyses- Objectives & Operationalization 
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Nuclear safety analysis-Master Logic diagram  (MLD)  
MLD-sequence  
‘top-down’ view of nuclear installation as whole system  global perspective of  
possible failures through a global fault tree 
global fault tree contains elaboration of failure combinations via logic gates (and/or 
functions) 
start with top-level event “excessive off-site releases” (i.e. radiological doses in 
excess of regulatory limits) and further break-down to the contributing elements: 
(1) release origin, 
(2) release paths and  species (tritium, activation products, dust, ….),  
(3) barriers that would have to fail to open release path, 
(4) safety functions that protect these barriers,  
(5) failure events that could degrade/disable these safety functions. 
at  (3), (4) AND gates appear  presence of barriers protected by multiple safety 
functions (more than one failure required to cause radiologic release) .  
MLD approach = plant-level functional nature (less detailed than FMEA !!!!).  
MLD list of failure event types = alternative approach to FMEA, 
                                                   used to obtain completeness in identification of all                                   
                                                   PIEs. 
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Nuclear safety analysis- Master Logic diagram  (MLD)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
superior safety objectives & goals 
fundamental safety functions 
probabilistic 
success criteria Defence in depth principle 
CLASS 1: prevention 
CLASS 2: control 
CLASS 3: accident management 
CLASS 4: control of severe conditions 
CLASS 5: mitigation of radiological consequences 
risk informed safety requirements 
applicable to design 
deterministic 
success criteria 
* Master logic diagram 
Gen IV safety approach 
General* 
 applied in hierarchical from plant to subsystem level  
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Nuclear safety analysis- Master Logic diagram  (MLD) 
Analysis for the generic FPP-plant 
for all conceivable accidents & incidents 
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Nuclear safety analysis- Safety demonstration 
Elements of the safety analysis 
event tree (sequence) analysis, 
fault tree analysis, 
dependent failures, 
personnel actions, 
internal impacts,  
external hazards (earth quake, flooding , terrorist attack,….) 
documentation and presentation of results. 
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Nuclear safety analysis- Safety demonstration 
Granting of a nuclear operation license scopes * 
safety report (essential design plant characteristics) and safety status report, 
system descriptions (specifications), circuit diagrams for safety-related systems, 
component descriptions & specifications, component basic position lists of safety-
related components, 
building plans, installation plans, piping isometrics, 
instrumentation & control documents (reactor protection report, function block 
diagrams, control diagrams, measuring device characteristics, signal processing with 
limit alarm settings, 
emergency electricity budgets, 
system dynamic investigation of transients, reports of loss of coolant accidents, 
used effectiveness conditions and constraints,  
operating manual, testing manual, 
documentation of maintenance concept and implementation 
documentation of the safety status analysis,  
management system and operational reports,  
emergency manual, documentation of emergency exercises,  
information on sources for determination of reliability indices,  
information on disorders (legacy body) and reportable events. 
Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, 2005, Methoden zur probabilistischen 
Sicherheitsanalyse für Kernkraftwerke  
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37/80 
Prescriptors 
 
 
 
Operator 
International     
R&D 
In-reactor 
LTAs 
 
Files 
   
Safety Analysis 
Reports 
Models 
Codes 
Methods 
Limits 
Regulator 
Domestic 
R&D 
Nuclear safety analysis- Safety demonstration 
© N. Waeckel, EDF,2011 
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Safety analysis: Integrated safety assessment 
Integrated Safety Assessment 
plant design exhibits 
acceptable levels of risk 
demonstrate perforrmance 
Identify important scenarios 
beyond design basis 
risk profile & dominant 
sequences 
reliability & consequence 
analysis 
reliability based 
assumptions 
capability based 
assumptions 
Probabilistic 
Criteria 
Deterministic 
Criteria 
technical specifications 
maintain validity of 
assumptions 
all identified 
scenarios 
expected 
scenarios 
add sequences not 
previously identified 
bounding consequences 
scenarios 
plant capable to confine/retent 
radioactive products 
Plant Design Basis 
Demonstrate capability 
Plant Reference Design 
Design Basis Accidents 
accident scenarios 
possible threats 
(initiators) 
functional 
analysis 
system 
analysis 
IAEA-TECDOC-1264 
38 
probabilistic safety 
asessment 
deterministic 
 safety asessment 
IAEA-TECDOC-1264 
reliability & availability 
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Nuclear safety analysis- Safety demonstration 
      Safety functions related to fusion power plants (FPP) 
 Primary safety functions 
 Confinement of radioactive materials 
 Control of operational releases  
 Limitation of accidental releases  
 No control of reactivity required (no nuclear chain reactions as in NPP !!!) 
 Secondary safety functions 
 Ensure emergency power shutdown 
 Provisions for decay heat removal (potentially passive) 
 Control of thermal energy (coolant(-s) enthalpy) 
 Control chemical energies  
 Control of other potentially likely energy discharges or interactions 
 Limitation of airborne & liquid operating releases to environment 
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Dose concept – 1(5) 
all exposures shall be kept  As Low As Reasonably Achievable, economic and 
social factors being taken into account* 
§ 5 Dose Limits*:  
20 mSv per year for occupationally exposed persons, 
  1 mSv per year for members of the public. 
 
* ICRP Recommendations 60, 103,  
   Directive 96/29/EURATOM 
persons under  
the age of 18 
members of 
the general 
public 
occupationally 
exposed persons 
occupational  
life dose 
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Is the ALARA Principle 
compatible with a 
 Dose Limit Principle? 
Dose Limits vs. ALARA 
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Dose- concept - 3(5) 
Ion Dose 
Directional Dose 
H*(10) 
H'(0,07) 
D 
w T 
Gy mSv 
HURLY-BURLY? 
Tissue Dose 
© modified from G. Frank, KIT 
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Dose Concept - 4(5) 
Radiologically 
[Sv]         weighted         [Sv] 
absorbed dose 
Directional 
dose equivalent 
H‘(0,07) 
Weakly penetrating 
radiation 
Hp(0,07) 
Strongly penetrating 
radiation 
Hp(10) 
Ambient  
dose equivalent 
H*(10) 
Concept of monitoring 
Dosimetry 
Dose equivalent 
Personal dose  
equivalent 
Local dose 
equivalent 
Committed 
effective dose 
Committed  
equivalent dose 
Body dose 
(equivalent dose) 
Concept of protection 
Dose limits 
Organ / tissue 
dose 
Effective dose 
weighted sum of 
organ / tissue doses 
individual   monitoring aerea   monitoring 
© modified from G. Frank, KIT 
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Dose concept - 5(5) 
Radiation Protection 
 DOSE usually applied in radiation protection is a measure for the risk of 
(stochastic) effects caused by radiation. 
 measuring unit:  Sievert (Sv) 
Representative values for effective dose 
 fatal dose      7000 mSv  
 threshold dose for deterministic health effects    500 mSv 
 X-ray tomography torso             up to 20 mSv 
 annual average of radiation exposure in Germany       4 mSv 
 annual dose limit for members of the general public        1 mSv 
 head radiography                              0.1 mSv  
 threshold dose for stochastical health effects             0 mSv 
Risk caused by ionising radiation 
 dose determines the risk of stochastic health effects. 
 risk of fatal cancer:   5 % per Sv (0,005 % per mSv)  
 risk of heritable effects:  1 % per Sv  (0,001 % per mSv) 
 (e.g. exposure of 1Million persons with 1mSv each causes 50 cases of fatal 
cancer.) 
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Fusion Safety Concept – NPP vs. FPP 1(3) 
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) 
nested physically static barriers 
high volumetric power density 
off-site fuel conditioning 
criticality prevention measures 
1% of Pth decay power 
very high radioactive inventory  
 
Fusion Power Plant (FPP) 
2 static but also dynamic barriers 
low volumetric power density 
on-site fuel management 
criticality arguments absent 
0.6% of Pth decay power 
high radioactive inventory (many 
mobile, different nuclide vectors) 
PCS   =pow. conv. System 
SA     =severe accident 
DHR  =decay heat removal 
VPSS=vacuum vessel  
             pressure suppression                   
             system 
modified from  K. Oh et al., Fusion Eng. Des. 88 (2013) 648 
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 4/5 static subsequent enveloped barriers 
 Static barriers for release control (mainly 
related to barriers + PAR+ PRS) 
 „practical elimination“ of level 5 by design + 
core catcher + mitigation chains 
 Compact system, small control volume, 
high power density, rare release paths 
 
NPP- PWR  
 Two static barriers extended over large scale 
 Mixture of static and dynamic barriers (DTS, 
TES, HVACS) 
 Large sets of active + passive systems (but 
lower inventory and energy content ) 
 Large volume, low power density, several 
release paths, dedicated rad. contaminants 
FPP  
Primary safety functions 
 Confinement 
 Control of releases 
 Limitation of releases 
 
Safety functions 
Fusion Safety Concept – NPP vs. FPP 2(3) 
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 Design measures (CR, n-poison) 
 DHR systems 
 not required (limited on-site storage of SA) 
 Multi-stage systems for severe accidents 
 
Secondary safety functions 
 terminate nuclear reactions 
 ensure decay heat removal 
 controlled chemical, magnetic, and thermal discharge 
 limit release to environment 
 PWR  
 FPSS (intrinsic feature-but early detection) 
 Passive design provisions 
 Physically different sub-systems required  
 Mobile species to identify 
FPP 
FPSS 
 Cryostat confinement ? 
 Double-walled containment ? 
Fusion Safety Concept – NPP vs. FPP 3(3) 
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Definition of plant state levels in DiD 
 
 
 
*INSAG 2010, WENRA2012 
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Safety risk approach 
 Discrimination  
Design Basis Accidents (DBA) 
* Design Basis Extension in ITER ~ BDBA 
Gulden,2012 
 Bounding accident sequences with dose criterion of 50mSv 
Design 
Basis 
Accident 
Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBA)*  
Beyond 
Design  
Basis 
Accident 
Bounding accident  
50 
public worker Evac. 
dose 
1mSv/a 20mSv/a 100mSv/a 
20µSv/w 2mSv/w 
3µSv/d 0,3mSv/h 0,3mSv/d 
Dose limits Germany 
mean nat. dose 1mSv/a 
Fusion Safety Concept – plant state description 3(5) 
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Safety risk approach 
 Mitigation into the acceptable risk zone by countermeasures  
 Diminution of dose rate by enhanced confinement 
 
 Gulden,2012 
anticipated incident 
additional  
safety 
system 
enhanced 
confinement 
both 
Fusion Safety Concept – plant state description 4(5) 
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Fusion Safety Concept – plant state description 5(5) 
Systematic Safety Analysis (SSA) - Success criteria 
normal operation   dose to worker on site          < limit  
accidental analysis :    worst dose to public (MEI)     < limit 
consequences:  mobility in long term storage  < limit (what ?) 
 all to be met 
PST=process source term 
EST=environmental source term 
antipcipated 
plant 
operation+ 
material 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INPUT 
normal operation  
(mainly governed by radio protection) 
accidental analysis 
inevitable consequences  
(radiation protection, societal contract) 
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Fusion Safety Concept – NPP vs. FPP 
Worst dose rates estimates (for the same power)  
 Different source terms 
 Fusion: tritium, dust, activation products, Activated Corrosion products (ACPs), neutron 
sputtering products. Tritium inventory in the Vacuum Vessel (VV) ~1kg. 
 Fission nuclides of PWR: Iodine, Cs-137, noble gases, aerosols, ...  
 NPP: effective dose of DBA ≤ 50mSv. BDBA e.g. 100mSv  evacuation 
 Fusion: bounding accident   ≤ 50mSv           no evacuation 
accidental releases  FPP by in-plant energies  several orders of magnitude lower 
than in NPPs. 
*1 Karditsas,PPCS,2004 
*2 Broeders, KANEXT,2011 
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Fusion Safety Concept – challenges safety analyses 
Postulated initiating events (internal events) 
 similar as in nuclear power plants such as  
 Loss of flow accident (LOFA),Loss of offsite-power (SBO), Leaks (VV, Primary System, 
…), Fire & explosion  
 additional fusion specific events: loss of cryo-system, arcing, magnets  affecting barriers  
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focus on performance of thermonuclear core - Blanket (~83%) 
Power)  
Concept  features 
EUROFER –struct. 
PFC –Material –W 
Differences 
Coolant(s) 
Neutron multiplier 
Temperatures 
Neutron wall load 
….. 
Consequences 
diff. enthalpy 
diff. chem. potential 
varying components 
 
 PCS=Power conversion system 
TES=Tritium extraction system 
CC  =Chemical control  
CPS=Coolant purification system 
Fusion Safety Concept – challenges safety analyses 
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Fusion Safety Concept – NPP vs. FPP 
Most crucial radiological event = Loss of coolant accident  (LOCA) at 
end of life  
Goal  
Safe heat removal without loss of functional integrity or confinement  
 
Example:  
LOCA in PCS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
Any safety demonstration design and system (including sec. side) dependent ! 
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Summary 
Fusion safety concepts relies on state-of-the-art safety concepts for  
nuclear installations containing radioactive environment and is based on 
DiD concept. 
Similarities and differences between safety concepts of fusion and fission. 
(deviations arise from radionuclide inventories and potential release paths) 
Plant-internal events do not lead to off-site evacuation 
Systematic assignment of measures & installations to the different levels 
of defence (as required by internat. fission regulations) has to be performed once 
an adequately detailed design level of a FPP is attained. 
Safety function “cooling” demands detailed design of in-vessel components 
(blanket & others) and necessitates demonstration of safe decay heat  
removal  development of validated tools mandatory 
External hazards must be included in the future safety analysis 
 
Numerous issues remain open and requires adequate attention 
Waste management has not been considered 
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Fusionreactor DEMO - severe accidents?   
Safety against external hazards- (“Fukushima challenge”) 
 Earthquake 
 Flooding  
 Air plane crash 
 Terrorist attack  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 more stringent rules for robustness demonstration against external hazards for 
NPP  (FPP)  are expected  
